<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="6.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Saqib Hasan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amin Ghafouri</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dubey, Abhishek</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Karsai, Gabor</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koutsoukos, Xenofon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vulnerability Analysis of Power Systems Based on Cyber-Attack and Defense Models</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT 2018)</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year></dates><urls><related-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://archive.isis.vanderbilt.edu/sites/default/files/paper_8.pdf</style></url></related-urls></urls><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Washington DC</style></pub-location><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reliable operation of power systems is a primary challenge for the system operators. With the advancement in
technology and grid automation, power systems are becoming more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The main goal of adversaries is to take advantage of these vulnerabilities and destabilize the system. This paper describes a game-theoretic approach to attacker / defender modeling in power systems. In our models, the
attacker can strategically identify the subset of substations that maximize damage when compromised. However, the defender can identify the critical subset of substations to protect in order to minimize the damage when an attacker launches a cyber-attack. The algorithms for these models are applied to the standard IEEE-14, 39, and 57 bus examples to identify the critical set of substations given an attacker and a defender budget.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>